Modernism’s Malice – IV
By Eleison Comments in Eleison Comments on June 6, 2020
These “Comments” of March 21 last claimed to be bringing into view “the incredible perversity, pride and perfidy” of Kant. That may seem strong language coming from a Catholic concerning a famous and merely worldly philosopher, but he is not merely worldly. Who that really knows the Revolution in the Church of Vatican II (1962–1965) would not recognise perversity, pride and perfidy as being its hallmarks? Strong language again? Let us see firstly how each of these three hallmarks applies to the principle that the mind is incapable of knowing its own object, extra-mental reality, for which it was designed by God (but Kantism was designed by Kant as a fortress precisely to shut out God, said the great theologian, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange [1877–1964]). And secondly, how the three marks apply to 1960’s Conciliarism.
PERVERSITY of Kantism When in his Summa Theologiae (2a2ae, 154, art.12) St Thomas Aquinas wishes to prove the supreme malice of homosexuality amongst the sins of impurity, he does it by comparing it with the denial of the principles of thinking inborn in the nature of the mind. But Kant denies not just one or two natural principles of the mind, he denies the application of every single inborn principle of the mind to external reality. Kantism is supremely perverse, and is not that conclusion corroborated by how widespread is the sin against nature among students in our Kantian “universities”?
and of Conciliarism Among Council documents, Dei Verbum section 8 paragraph 2 gives an ambiguous definition of living Tradition, in the name of which John-Paul II condemned that unchanging Catholic Tradition in the name of which Archbishop Lefebvre had just consecrated four bishops in June of 1988. In other words, Catholic Truth so changes down the ages that the Archbishop’s version of objective and unchanging Tradition is no longer acceptable. This melting of Catholic Truth is totally perverse.
PRIDE of Kantism If the “Thing in itself” created by God is unknowable to me on the other side of the appearances, where my mind cannot reach, and if, as Kantism holds, I recompose the thing from the sense appearances in accordance with the prior laws of my own mind, then I become the creator of things, they are fabricated by me, and I take the place of God. For indeed God very rarely makes Himself perceptible to the human senses – even Incarnate and touched by St Thomas, the Apostle still needed an act of faith to believe in His godhead (Jn. XX, 28) – so God is behind the sense-appearances, so, for Kant, He is inaccessible to my mind. He depends on my will to believe in Him, thus: Not what I know but what I want is what is real. Now I want God. So God is real. If this is the basis of God’s existence, could it be more fragile? And if God depends on me to want Him for Him to exist, could pride be more insane?
and of Conciliarism As Fr Calderón makes abundantly clear in his study of Vatican II, Prometheus, the key to the modern man to whom it is the Council’s purpose to adapt the religion of God, is liberty. Modern man will accept no objective truth imprisoning his mind, no objective law commanding his will, no grace healing his nature for any other purpose than nature’s own freedom. In brief, modern man will have nothing and nobody superior to him. He is the supreme creature by his freedom. Also, he is more free than God because he is free to choose evil, which God is not. Again, could pride be more mad?
PERFIDY of Kantism To deny, as does Kantism, that the mind can know anything beyond the sense-appearances, is not to deny that things are what they are, it is merely to make the utterly absurd pretention that they depend on my mind to be what they are. Thus for purposes of living, even surviving, my great mind is bound to fabricate meals on the appearance of my kitchen-table, otherwise I will get rather hungry. And similarly I will fabricate all things necessary for daily existence. So I can behave in daily life just like a normal non-Kantian, and deceive people that I am not crazy at all. Only if I tell them that my mind fabricated the breakfast will they realise that they are dealing with a madman. Thus I can hide from view my radical inward betrayal of outward reality. This is potentially perfidious.
and of Conciliarism Vatican II is not just potentially but actually perfidious because, again as Fr Calderón makes abundantly clear, its very essence was to create a new man-centred humanism which would be able to pass itself of as being still God-centred Catholicism. Objective disguise and deceit were written into the Council’s charter from the very beginning.